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The Three Mechanisms of Police Power that Crush Reform

How police unions avoid regulation, protect their discretion, and win the urban governance policy game—even when the political deck is stacked against them.

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It’s often taken for granted that police unions operate as the well-oiled political machine of law enforcement and a powerful interest group and organization in urban politics. Despite growing interest in the history of police unions and their political militancy, social-scientific research on their contemporary strategies is lagging. To better understand the behavior of police departments as organizations and officers as street-level bureaucrats in the age of Black Lives Matter, research has to capture the role of the unions sitting between the street, the department brass, and city hall.

Unsurprisingly, the inner workings of police union organizational behavior remain a virtual black box. Unlike police departments, police unions are private nonprofit organizations not subject to public records laws or transparency requirements, and can adopt a greater posture of institutional defensiveness. For social scientists, and sociologists in particular, the study of police unions has been limited. If it’s true that police unions are highly effective at shaping local politics, defining police culture, and extracting material concessions for their members, the mechanisms that explain why this is the case should matter to anyone interested in issues ranging from police reform to the effectiveness of organized labor.

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Based on emerging historical and empirical research, as well as my own findings, police unions draw on three broad sources of power in contemporary battles over public safety policy and politics. The first is political: unions spend on campaigns, endorse candidates, mobilize members to vote as a bloc, run fear campaigns through social and traditional media, and distribute patronage-like PBA cards. Secondly, police unions wield organizational power through actions such as slowdowns, shirking, “Blue Flu” sick-outs, and no-confidence votes against police chiefs who do not serve their interests. They can loudly and publicly announce that crime spikes or degraded services, real or imagined, are the fault of particular politicians. Third, police unions maintain legal and bargaining power, exercised through collective-bargaining agreements, binding arbitration, and lawsuits challenging reform. 

Some of these protections—such as access to binding arbitration in labor contract negotiations and in appeals of individual disciplinary cases—are rarely extended to other municipal employees. Other provisions, including disproportionate wage increases, bonuses, pension obligations, and overtime entitlements, can crowd out spending on other city services. These rights that police have above what most municipal workers enjoy are not intrinsic to the profession, they have been won in the political arena where police unions come well prepared to extract concessions. As one Fraternal Order of Police leader put it during collective-bargaining negotiations with city officials in 2019, “It’s like the L.A. Lakers or the 76ers going up against a grade school team.”


Because of the powers at police unions’ disposal, a reform-minded police chief or mayor may struggle to implement change when a police union pushes back. In San Francisco, Cincinnati, and Rochester, police unions have sued over measures including non-police crisis response programs, police accountability boards, and civilian traffic enforcement. In 2022, the Philadelphia Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) sued to block the city’s Driving Equality law, which limited pretextual traffic stops. As a result, attempted reforms are often sold through an appeasement frame; for example, New York City’s mayor Zohran Mamdani pitched his proposed Department of Community Safety as an officer wellness initiative, a way to reduce the burden on officers forced to work excessive overtime.

Chicago, the focus of my research on police unions, offers a particularly striking example of police union resistance to reform. It is therefore an ideal case study for examining how police unions fight reform when under threat. The FOP is the largest association of sworn law enforcement officers in the world, and Lodge 7, its Chicago affiliate, has the largest membership of any lodge in the country, representing approximately 17,000 active-duty and retired Chicago officers. In addition the city has seen fervent demand for reform since the 2014 murder of Laquan McDonald; the establishment of a newly independent Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) in 2017; a consent decree in 2019 and the creation of the department’s Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform in 2020; and the formation of a Democratic Socialist (DSA) caucus in the City Council in 2021—the largest such bloc in the country. 

Yet meaningful change remains far off. Between 2020 and 2025, Chicago taxpayers spent nearly $862 million implementing the consent decree, while CPD complied with only 23 percent of its mandated reforms. Use-of-force incidents increased 47 percent between 2023 and 2024, and the racial disparities in traffic and pedestrian stops have not budged. 

But why have these attempts at reform been stymied? How do police unions avoid regulation, protect their discretion, and win the urban governance policy game—even when the political deck is stacked against them?

I argue that one important reason is the Chicago’s FOP’s use of the political, legal, and organizational power described above to shield CPD from reform. Under the more overtly militant and political leadership of its president, John Catanzara, the union has pursued these efforts despite their unpopularity with Chicagoans and the fact that they are not always endorsed by the department itself. 


In May 2020, just weeks before George Floyd’s murder, Catanzara won the FOP presidency. A CPD officer since 1995, he had racked up fifty misconduct complaints and been suspended multiple times during his career. In 2019, he was stripped of his police powers after filing a false report against then-Superintendent Eddie Johnson. 

And while he was in some ways a reformer, Catanzara adopted a more militant posture than his predecessors and became more visible in both local and national politics, reshaping the FOP in important ways. Early in his tenure, he told members in the union’s monthly newsletter: “My name and my reputation will make for good copy…You have someone who is not afraid to push back.” His social media presence was infamous: he called for violence against Black Lives Matter protesters and stated that Muslims “all deserve a bullet.” He also became a regular on Fox News, cultivating a national profile in conservative media that his predecessors had never achieved, and endorsed Donald Trump in 2016 and 2020. Catanzara even kept a printed-out tweet of Trump praising him on his desk and appeared on the White House lawn during Trump’s 2020 acceptance speech. Catanzara was the figure for a moment when the politics of policing had become nationalized and police identity had grown more intertwined with conservative movement politics than at any point since the urban crisis of the 1960s.

The FOP’s previous contract had expired in June 2017, and Catanzara campaigned on the promise to negotiate a new agreement that would provide greater benefits to officers while avoiding new accountability restrictions imposed by the city’s consent decree. When the city offered a 10 percent raise in exchange for the FOP’s acceptance of forty disciplinary reforms required by the decree, Catanzara walked out of the meeting. His tenure has been marked by resistance to consent decree implementation and misconduct reform efforts more broadly.


Since 2020, under Cantanzara’s leadership, FOP campaign contributions have spiked, with resources concentrated on a few key players. Funds have flowed primarily to candidates who were formerly police officers, alderpersons representing wards where many officers live, and members of key public safety committees. Despite these efforts, most FOP-backed non-incumbents lost in the 2023 aldermanic races. 

Outside of electoral politics, however, the FOP has been more successful. In 2023, the union sued to challenge the city’s civilian oversight system. It argued that cases involving serious discipline—termination, or suspensions exceeding thirty days—should bypass public hearings before the civilian members of the Chicago Police Board and proceed directly to private arbitration. In March 2024, the Cook County Circuit Court ruled in the union’s favor. 

The consequences have been devastating. The share of serious cases resulting in penalties above the threshold collapsed from 33 percent to just 4 percent. The city knows that if it imposes serious discipline, the FOP will grieve it to an arbitrator who is likely to overturn or reduce it. Grievance filings increased 56 percent, and officers grieving the most serious discipline are especially likely to succeed. 

While the Circuit Court ruling now permits officers to bypass the Police Board, it is unclear whether arbitration hearings will be held in public or private. As a result, hundreds of complaints remain unresolved. In these cases, the Civilian Office of Police Accountability has sustained allegations of misconduct, but the CPD’s superintendent, Larry Snelling, has not decided whether to impose discipline. As Chicago Police Board President Kyle Cooper observed, the FOP’s lawsuit “has brought to a standstill consideration of the vast majority of cases in which the recommendation is to discharge the accused officer from the Chicago Police Department.”

The FOP’s legal strategy has brought the city’s disciplinary system to its knees, and the consequence may be more aggressive police behavior on Chicago’s streets.


The tactics that unions like Chicago’s FOP use to fight reform are not beyond the reach of local policy. Several measures could begin to curb union power, make it more visible and accountable, and similar to that of other public sector unions. 

To address slowdowns, cities could require real-time public reporting of police response times down to the neighborhood level, producing timely data on what police do and where, not just on crime and arrests. Cities can also reduce police departments’ monopoly over emergency response by creating new first-responder teams for issues such as mental health crises. That way, a union’s threat to withhold labor is less likely to damage the provision of essential city services. Another promising area is reforming the collective bargaining process itself. Cities could bring police contract rights in line with other unions and make negotiations a source for public debate. Concrete steps include eliminating mandatory binding arbitration for disciplinary appeals, opening contract negotiations to public participation, requiring public disclosure of contract terms before ratification, and prohibiting provisions that destroy misconduct records. The arbitration system needs particular attention: reforms could address the incentives created by repeat appointments, transfer disciplinary appeals to publicly accountable bodies, and end the mutual veto that lets unions block arbitrators they dislike.

A final set of measures could target the economics of misconduct. Although constitutional doctrine holds officers liable for misconduct, in practice, cities indemnify them and leave taxpayers to foot the bill. Police officers, through the FOP, could be legally required to maintain collective insurance against misconduct claims, with the insurer assuming liability. This would shift costs from taxpayers to the institutions that defend misconduct. 

The common thread is that police union contracts and political activities should be central subjects of democratic debate and reform: openly contested rather than overlooked. Recent historical work has shown that police union power is a relatively recent development. Social scientists today are well-positioned to examine how police unions operate and to generate new knowledge about their strategies, as well as the policy reforms that could curb their worst excesses.

Image credit: Eduardo Chillida, Small Intaglio-Carved Marble Plaque, 1963. Harvard Art Museums/Fogg Museum, Gift of Frederic and Siena Ossorio